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Kalle and me. Schumpeter, too.

May 6, 2018 - 14:48 -- Admin

[One of my intellectual heroes, Karl Marx, had his 200th birthday (May 5) this weekend. So I decided to reflect on his influence. I will add a few links later. Also fix typos … .]

My first encounter with Kalle was when I was still in (the equivalent of) high school. Things were heating up in (West) Germany around that time: students started marching against a “system” that had allowed atrocities abroad (Remember Vietnam, that last and long-lasting proxy battle of the Cold War?) and also at home where the old Nazis were still very much in power (Remember “Silver Tongue” Kiesinger?) and, it seemed, had adopted the Social Democrats (being themselves quite an old-boys network, although of another kind) via a Grand Coalition with him and his.

The suffocating stuffiness that still hung over Germany in the early sixties soon fell by the wayside, culturally as much as politically, and by the late sixties Kiesinger was gone and in the fall of 1969 that “traitor”, Willy Brandt, was German chancellor. People like Udo Lindenberg, and a number of the Krautrock and Schneeball groups, started to sing in German and it was not embarrassing. Alles klar auf der Andrea Doria! Keine Macht fuer Niemand! (Of course, all of these German bands had to fight the onslaught of bands from Great Britain and the United States.) There were charismatic figures such as the informal leader of the extraparliamentary opposition, Rudi Dutschke, the Kommune 1 in Berlin with its fun guerilla faction, and the no-fun guerilla of the Red Army Faction (Baader, Ensslin, Mahler, Meinhof, et al.) which soon after went from agitating to murder and brought about, in 1977, The German Autumn. There was also an emerging environmental movement in the seventies that did its fair share, and then some, to change the policy discourse in Germany for decades to come. All of this happened against the backdrop of a divided Germany, in a key theatre of the Cold War, where one part called itself the German Democratic Republic but was hardly that.

Around the same time (ca 1967 – 1970) my parents fought hard a battle of the roses that saw my (younger, by three years) brother’s life derailed and him dead of an overdose a decade later and me dropping out of school, leaving “home” prematurely, moving to the big city (well for me, that was what Bielefeld was then), and becoming part of the proletariat at age 18, working for about a year as warehouse worker and delivery driver for Thyssen-Schulte, before — after a few months of hitch-hiking through Europe –, I joined the army. I spent much of the next two years deep in the heart of conservative and catholic Bavaria (1972 – 1974), much of it in an alpine communication unit.  Quite an experience it was.

After the years in the military, I entered an experimental college back in Bielefeld, studying political economy, math, Russian, and Portuguese during 1974 – 1978. I also spent a couple of weeks in Oberhof, Thuringia (then part of the German Democratic Republic), on an all-expenses paid trip where I was taught the Socialist way of thinking in the morning and got to ski in the afternoon, with enough space left for plenty of drinking and carousing in the evenings. Paid by the Konsumgenossenschaft, the trip was the East-German Communist Party’s attempt to pry away from the West promising young things. I was not quite persuaded and did not take it up on the invitation.

It was during that first year in Bielefeld, and way before my trip to Oberhof, when I started to read Marx. In reading groups we slugged our way through The Communist Manifesto (quickly) and then (way more slowly) through Das Kapital, volume one.  Never quite finished it from what I vaguely recall. Not even close.  And, frankly, we all got quite bored reading it and had trouble buying into the promises of the discussion leaders that, in the end, it all would make sense. It did get me interested enough that — when I entered that experimental college in Bielefeld — political economy was my choice of major, together with math. And it was there that I studied Marx’s work more carefully. And I was not the only one … several fellow students and teachers were into it … (a couple of the teachers being true armchair Marxists who thought that interpreting the world on a decent salary was good enough after all.)

I read a lot those years, often sitting in my small rented basement room in the Von-Ossietzky-Strasse until deep in the wee hours, sipping cheap Moroccan red wine, popping Adumbran to be able to sleep in the wee hours, with good old Brecht looking over my shoulder. Among the things I read – I can tell because I still have the marked-up copy — was Wygodski’s book, published in East Berlin in 1976, on how Das Kapital emerged from Marx early writings. Wygodski’s books were remarkable in that they showed how early some of Marx’s (and Engels’s) theories about society, economics, politics, and culture were fixed. There are interesting parallels here to how the ideas underlying Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations emerged over decades of thinking about them. I also read Theorien über den Mehrwert, often called the fourth volume of Das Kapital which demonstrates that Marx knew his stuff and was indeed a first-rate historian of thought to start with. But of course, he was much more: Philosopher, sociologist, economist, political scientist, activist, agitator, …

As I progressed in my career, I lost sight of the insights to be found in Marx’s writings. With the fall of socialism, in the USSR and its satellite states in Central Europe, the evidence seemed to suggest that certain realizations of Marxian ideas (or what some people considered them) had overstayed their welcome. Of course, Marx’s ideas do live on these days in China where Xi Jinping just recently made clear the importance of The Communist Manifesto. Marx’s ideas havea also lived on in some academic branches such as sociology. The authors of the Wikipedia entry on Kalle seem to assert correctly that he is typically cited as one of the principal architects of modern social science. Even that curmudgeon of a historian, Schumpeter, who thought little of Adam Smith but can hardly be accused of having communist sympathies, was surprisingly positive about Marx, calling him a “first-rank economist” (History of Economics Analysis p. 224), among other laudatory names.  It was no coincidence that Schumpeter featured Marx prominently in Ten Great Economists. In contrast, Smith did not make the cut. Go figure.
Here are some excerpts from Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis (Perlman edition):

p. 370 Any economist who wishes to study Marx at all must resign himself to reading carefully the whole of the three volumes of Das Kapital and of the three volumes of Theorien über den Mehrwert.Fn

Further, there is no point whatever in tackling Marx without preparation. Not only is he a difficult author but, owing to the nature of his scientific apparatus, he cannot be understood without a working knowledge of the economics of his epoch, Ricardo in particular, and of economic theory in general. This is all the more important because the necessity for it does not show on the surface. Again, the reader must be on his guard against being misled by traces of Hegelian terminology. It will be argued below that Marx did not allow his analysis to be influenced by Hegelian philosophy. But he sometimes uses terms in their specifically Hegelian sense, and a reader who takes them in their usual sense misses Marx’s meaning.

Fn. The Communist Manifesto is also indispensable, of course. But for any purpose short of becoming a Marxologist, I think that nothing need be added except the Class Struggles in France, articles written in 1848–50, published as a book, with an introduction by Engels in 1895. Only the Marxologist need go into Marx’s correspondence.

p. 366 … nobody will ever understand Marx and his work who does not attach appropriate weight to the erudition that went into it—the fruit of incessant labor that, starting from primarily- philosophical and sociological interests in his early years, was concentrated increasingly on economics as time went on, until his working hours were all but monopolized by it. Nor was his the kind of mind in which scholarly coal puts out the fire: with every fact, with every argument that impinged upon him in his reading, he wrestled with such passionate zest as to be incessantly diverted from his main line of advance. On this I cannot insist too strongly. This fact would be my central theme were I to write a Marxology. Perusal of his Theorien über den Mehrwert suffices to convince one of it. And, once proved, it serves to establish in turn another fact and to solve a much discussed riddle: it serves to establish that he was a born analyst, a man who felt impelled to do analytic work, whether he wanted to or not and no matter what his intentions were; … our information warrants the statements that he was very much a philosopher dabbling in sociology and politics (as do so many philosophers) until he went to Paris; that there he quickly made headway and found his feet as an economist; and that by the time he and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto (1847; published 1848); that is to say, at the age of 29,7 he was in possession of all the essentials that make up the Marxist Social Science, the only important lacunae being in the field of technical economics. For the rest, the main line of his intellectual life may be described as a series of efforts to work out that Social Science and to fill those lacunae—tasks which, I believe, Marx did not expect would involve any insurmountable difficulties, though he did expect that a great deal of further work would be required to straighten out and co-ordinate everything that was to find a place within the vast structure.

p. 33 Half a century before the full importance of this phenomenon [ideological bias, AO] was professionally recognized and put to use, Marx and Engels discovered it and used their discovery in their criticisms of the ‘bourgeois’ economics of their time. Marx realized that men’s ideas or systems of ideas are not, as historiography is still prone to assume uncritically, theprime movers of the historical process, but form a ‘superstructure’ on more fundamental factors, as will be explained at the proper place in our narrative. Marx realized further that the ideas or systems of ideas that prevail at any given time in any given social group are, so far as they contain propositions about facts and inferences from facts, likely to bevitiated for exactly the same reasons that also vitiate a man’s theories about his own individual behavior. That is to say, people’s ideas are likely to glorify the interests and actions of the classes that are in a position to assert themselves and therefore are likely to draw or to imply pictures of them that may be seriously at variance with the truth. … Such systems of ideas Marx called ideologies.4 And his contention was that a large part of the economics of his time was nothing but the ideology of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. The value of this great contribution to our insight into the processes of history and into the meaning of social science is impaired but not destroyed by three blemishes, …

p. 20 … an economics that includes an adequate analysis of government action and of the mechanisms and prevailing philosophies of political life is likely to be much more satisfactory to the beginner than an array of different sciences which he does not know how to co-ordinate—whereas, to his delight, he finds precisely what he seeks ready-made in Karl Marx. An economics of this type is sometimes presented under the title Political Economy.  …

p. 363 The difficulty is that in Marx’s case we lose something that is essential to understanding him when we cut up his system into component propositions and assign separate niches to each, as our mode of procedure requires. To some extent this is so with every author: the whole is always more than the sum of the parts. But it is only in Marx’s case that the loss we suffer by neglecting this2 is of vital importance, because the totality of his vision, as a totality, asserts its right in every detail and is precisely the source of the intellectual fascination experienced by everyone, friend as well as foe, who makes a study of him. Marx figures in this book only as a sociologist and an economist. Of course, that creed-creating prophet was much more than this. And his creed-creating activity, on the one hand, and his policy-shaping and agitatorial activity, on the other hand, are inextricably interwoven with his analytic activity. So much is this the case that the question arises whether he can be called an analytic worker at all. This question may be answered in the negative from two very different standpoints.  …

p. 364 My answer to our question is, however, in the affirmative. The warrant for this affirmative answer is in the proposition that the bulk of Marx’s work is analytic by virtue of its logical nature, for it consists in statements of relations between social facts. For instance, the proposition that a government is essentially an executive committee of the bourgeois class may be entirely wrong; but it embodies a piece of analysis in our sense, acceptance or refutation of which is subject to the ordinary rules of scientific procedure. It would be absurd indeed to describe the Communist Manifesto, in which this proposition occurs, as a publication of scientific character or to accept it as a statement of scientific truth. It is not less absurd to deny that, even in Marx’s most scientific work, his analysis was distorted not only by the influence of practical purposes, not only by the influence of passionate value judgments, but also by ideological delusion. Finally, it would be absurd to deny the difficulty that in some cases rises to impossibility of disentangling his analysis from its ideological element. But ideologically distorted analysis is still analysis. It may even yield elements of truth. …

To sum up: … we simply recognize him as a sociological and economic analyst whose propositions (theories) have the same methodological meaning and standing and have to be interpreted according to the same criteria as have the propositions of every other sociological and economic analyst; we do not recognize any mystic halo.

p.367 The ‘pieces’ divide up into two groups, one sociological and the other economic. The sociological pieces include contributions of the first order of importance such as the Economic Interpretation of History, which, as I shall argue, may be considered as Marx’s own, quite as much as Darwin’s descent of man is Darwin’s own. But the rest of Marx’s sociology—the sociological framework that, like every economist, he needed for his economic theory—is neither objectively novel nor subjectively original. His preconceptions about the nature of the relations between capital and labor, in particular, he simply took from an ideology that was already dominant in the radical literature of his time. If, however, we wish to trace them further back, we can do so without difficulty. A very likely source is the Wealth of Nations. A.Smith’s ideas on the relative position of capital and labor were bound to appeal to him, especially as they linked up with a definition of rent and profits—as ‘deductions from the produce of labour’ (Book I, ch. 8, ‘Of the Wages of Labour’)—that is strongly suggestive of an exploitation theory. But these ideas were quite common during the enlightenment and their real home was France. French economists, ever since Boisguillebert, had explained property in land by violence, and Rousseau and many philosophers had expanded on the subject. There is, however, one writer, Linguet, who, more explicitly than others, drew exactly the picture that Marx made his own: the picture not only of landlords who subject and exploit rural serfs, but also of industrial and commercial employers who do exactly the same thing to laborers who are nominally free, yet actually slaves.This sociological framework offered most of the pegs that Marx needed in order to have something upon which to hang his glowing phrases. And since historians are primarily interested in these, no matter whether they admire them or are shocked by them, it is difficult to gain assent to what is the obvious truth about the nature of thepurely economic pieces of the Marxist system. This obvious truth is that, as far as pure theory is concerned, Marx must be considered a ‘classic’ economist and more specifically a member of the Ricardian group. Ricardo is the only economist whom Marx treated as a master. I suspect that he learned his theory from Ricardo. But much more important is the objective fact that Marx used the Ricardian apparatus: he adopted Ricardo’s conceptual layout and his problems presented themselves to him in the forms that Ricardo had given to them. No doubt, he transformed these forms and he arrived in the end at widely different conclusions. But he always did so by way of starting from, and criticizing, Ricardo—criticism of Ricardo was his method in his purely theoretical work.

p.369 … admit that Marx could ever grow out of date in any respect. However, in order to drive home a point that seems important, I have strictly confined myself in the preceding paragraph to Marx’s theoretical technique. But there are two features of Marxist theory that transcend technique. And these were not period-bound. The one is his tableau économique. In his analysis of the structure of capital, Marx developed Ricardo once more. But there is an element in it that does not hail from Ricardo but may hail from Quesnay: Marx was one of the first to try to work out an explicit model of the capitalist process. The other is still more important. Marx’s theory is evolutionary in a sense in which no other economic theory was: it tries to uncover the mechanism that, by its mere working and without the aid of external factors, turns anygiven state of society into another.

p.408 … the period’s great performance in the field of political sociology stands in the name of Karl Marx. …  I wish merely to say by way of anticipation that Marx’s theories of history, of social classes, and of the state (government) constitute, on the one hand, the first serious attempts to bring the state down from the clouds and, on the other hand, the best criticism, by implication, of the Benthamite construct. Unfortunately, this scientific theory of the state, like so much else in Marxist thought, is all but spoiled by the particularly narrow ideology of its author. What a pity, but at the same time, what a lesson and what a challenge!

p.413 [Marxist Evolutionism] I have just adverted to the possible implications for sociology that a despiritualized Hegelian philosophy might harbor. This suggests that here we have after all more than a phraseological influence of Hegel upon Marx. If, nevertheless, we maintain substantive autonomy of Marx’s so-called Materialistic Interpretation of History as against Hegelism, and if we list it as a separate type of evolutionism, we allow ourselves to be guided by two considerations. First, Marx’s theory of history developed independently of Marx’s Hegelian affiliation. We know that his analysis started from a criticism of the current (and apparently immortal) error that the behavior that produces history is determined by ideas (or the ‘progress of the human mind’), and that these in turn are infused into actors by purely intellectual processes. To start with this criticism is a perfectly sound and very positive method but has nothing to do with Hegelian speculation. Second, Marx’s theory of history is a working hypothesis by nature. It is compatible with any philosophy or creed and should therefore not be linked up with any particular one—neither Hegelianism nor materialism is necessary or sufficient for it. What remains is, again, Marx’s preference for Hegelian phrasing—and his own and most, though not all, Marxists’ preference for anything that sounds anti-religious.

p.414 Both the achievement embodied in that hypothesis and the limitations of this achievement may be best conveyed by means of a brief and bald statement of the essential points. (1) All the cultural manifestations of ‘civil society’—to use the eighteenth-century term—are ultimately functions of its class structure.8 (2) A society’s class structure is, ultimately and chiefly, governed by the structure of production (Produktionsverhältnisse), that is, a man’s or a group’s position in the social class structure is determined chiefly by his or its position in the productive process. (3) The social process of production displays an immanent evolution (tendency to change its own economic, hence also social, data). To this we add the essential points of Marx’s theory of social classes, which is logically separable from points (1) to (3) that define the economic interpretations of history but forms part of it within the Marxian scheme. (1′) The class structure of capitalist society may be reduced to two classes: the bourgeois class that owns, and the proletarian class that does not own, the physical means of production, which are ‘capital’ if owned by employers but would not be ‘capital’ if owned by the workers who use them. (2′) By virtue of the position of these classes in the productive process, their interests are necessarily antagonistic. (3′) The resulting class struggle or class war (Klassenkampf) provides the mechanisms—economic and political—that implement the economic evolution’s tendency to change (revolutionize) every social organization and all the forms of a society’s civilization that exist at any time. All this we may sum up in three slogans: politics, policies, art, science, religious and other beliefs or creations, are all superstructures (Überbau) of the economic structure of society; historical evolution is propelled by economic evolution; history is the history of class struggles.

This is as fair a presentation of Marx’s social evolutionism as I am able to provide in a nutshell. The achievement is of first-rank importance although the elements that enter into it are of very unequal value or, rather, unequally impaired by obvious ideological bias. … … the economic interpretation of history … . If we reduce it to therole of a working hypothesis and if we carefully formulate it, discarding all philosophical ambitions that are suggested by the phrases Historical Materialism or Historical Determinism, we behold a powerful analytic achievement. Points (1) and (3) may then be defended against objections, most of which turn out to rest upon misunderstandings. We have reached a point of vital importance for a proper understanding of Marx’s work. … we can now visualize his unitary Social Science, the only significant all-comprehensive system that dates from this side of utilitarianism: we see the manner and the sense in which he welded into a single homogeneous whole all branches of sociology and economics—a venture that might well dazzle the modern disciple even more than it dazzled Engels, who stood too near the workshop. .. Here I wish only to insist on the greatness of the conception and on the fact that Marxist analysis is the only genuinely evolutionary economic theory that the period produced.14 Neither its assumptions nor its techniques are above serious objections—though, partly, because it has been left unfinished. But the grand vision of an immanent evolution of the economic process— that, working somehow through accumulation, somehow destroys the economy as well as the society of competitive capitalism and somehow produces an untenable social situation that will somehow give birth to another type of social organization—remains after the most vigorous criticism has done its worst. It is this fact, and this fact alone, that constitutes Marx’s claim to greatness as an economic analyst.

Some of Marx’s insights have stayed with me. Here is a list of ten great insights and phrases, straight form the horse’s mouth. Memorable, and still rather pertinent.

10. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.” [These words are also inscribed upon his grave]” (Eleven Theses on Feuerbach)

9. “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.” (Capital, Vol 1: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production)

8. “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.” (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

7. “In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.” (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)

6. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)

5. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas.” (The German Ideology)

4. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, that each time ended, either in the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.” (The Communist Manifesto)

3. “Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange, and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.” (The Communist Manifesto)

2. “Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Workingmen of all countries unite!” (The Communist Manifesto)

1. “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” (A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy … )