Safe to say this issue will never be resolved
Twenty-five years ago, the world waited for the dawn of a new millennium (a few pedants grumbled that the millennium wouldn’t start until 2001, but no one paid much attention). The excitement of the occasion was tempered by concern, and, in some quarters panic, about the possibility of a massive computer outage resulting from the “Y2K” or “millennium” bug.
The origin story of the bug was that, in the 1970s and 1980s, computer programmers had saved space, or merely effort, by coding years with two digits rather than four. Indeed, the habit was so ingrained that the dominant operating system of the day was called Windows 98, and required some minor fixed to deal with the arrival of the year 2000.
Without such adjustments, it was feared, computer programs would misperceive dates in 2000 as if they were in 1900, producing chaotic errors. The issue had been discussed on the then-nascent Internet for years, mostly in humorous terms. But as the critical date approached, the tone turned to panic, at least in the main English speaking countries.
The catalyst was the realisation that the bug might be found in “embedded systems”, such as the microchips found in virtually every modern device, such as aircraft and lift control system. If they failed, technological society might grind to a halt producing the scenario discussed as ‘“The End Of The World As We Know It” (TEOTWAWKI). This scenario was taken seriously enough to generate an effort to check everything from fax machines to microwave ovens.
It soon became clear, however that most problems with embedded chips could not be fixed without scrapping the devices in which they were embedded. Fortunately, no one had been silly enough to design them to rely critically on knowing the date. Except for a minority of true believers (some of whom welcomed the coming apocalypse) TEOTWAWKI faded from view, and attention was focused on software. However, the level of panic did not decline.
At the other end of the spectrum from the TEOTWAKI panic were a small group, labelled “Pollyannas” (of whom I was one, along with investigative journalist Stuart Fist). The Pollyannas argued that, except for mission-critical systems where exact timing control was essential, there was no reason to devote any more, or less, effort to the Y2K bug than to any of the myriad of bugs that affected computer systems, then and now. The best response, in most cases was “fix on failure”, solving problems as they emerged.
As and computers began making calculations about events in 2000 and beyond, it was widely expected that Y2K bugs would begin to emerge. The Gartner group suggested that around 30 per cent of failures would occur before 20002 As 1999 progressed, the absence of any serious incidents led the Pollyannas to predict that would be a non-event, even for the schools, businesses and entire countries that had done little or nothing to make their systems compliant.
This was, however, a minority position. The dominant view was that, while most large organizations in the English speaking world had fixed the problem in time, the results elsewhere would be dire. Travel advisories were issued telling people to avoid countries like Italy and Russia. Non-essential embassy staff were withdrawn. Widespread small business failures were expected.
When the first day of the millennium arrived without incident, everyone claimed victory. The Pollyannas pointed to the correctness of their predictions. Some of the remaining handful of TEOTWAWKI believers suggested that the system really had collapsed, but that the truth was being kept from us. Supporters of the remediation effort claimed credit for fixing large systems, and suggested that some form of herd immunity had protected those who had failed to take action.
Mostly, however, we were eager to forget the whole business. In Australia, the Senate produced a five-page report, concluding that our $12 billion had been well spent. In the US, where the cost ran to hundreds of billions, there was a 30-page report. This report also claimed success for the remediation program but concluded that “fix on failure” had been the right approach for small businesses.
And, 25 years later, no one much has changed their mind. Those involved in the remediation process still consider it a great success, the Pollyannas point to the lack of any serious evaluation and the public as a whole is confused.
There’s a striking contrast here with climate change. A mountain of scientific research built up over decades, has failed to move governments to vigorous action, even as the costs of inaction become apparent. By contrast, there was almost no serious peer-reviewed research evaluating the seriousness of the the Y2K problem or the costs and benefits of alternative responses.
Rashomon allusions are overused, but they are irresistible in relation to Y2K. For programmers in large organisations, the experience of Y2k remediation was that of a huge effort that fixed plenty of bugs was 100 % effective. For small businesses and schools, another thing to worry about about, but too hard to solve, leading to “fix on failure” when problems emerged. For Pollyannas like me who correctly predicted few critical problems anywhere, vindication, but no credit. For most people, another panic and false alarm.